Tears of Namka Chu River

Despite vintage weapons, limited ammunition, inclement weather, lack of cold weather clothing, lack of Arty support and without offensive air support, the Indian soldiers fought bravely in Kameng sector of NEFA

By Col Alok Mathur

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My name is Namka Chu. My address is west Kameng District adjoining Bhutan border in North east frontier agency (NEFA) about 25 kms north of Tawang  town.  I am  about  26 kilometres (km) long and  flow  from  west to east  at mild speed of 8  to  10  knots  in winter season and  15 to 20 knots in  monsoon.  I flow between Thangla Ridge in north and Dhola range to the south. My width varies from 5 metres to 20 metres. My origin is from Twin reservoirs of Tsangle located at 17000 feet on trijunction of Bhutan, Tibet and India. My bed is full of rounded moss coated stones and few big rocks in the mid stream. I finally merge in to my elder sister river Nyamjang Chu  at Dorkung Samba  bridge  which flows from  North to south and merges  down south into river Tawang Chu  on  India Bhutan frontier. I am a silent river but water stream makes pleasant sound when it skirts the big rocks in my path. Over the years, seven bridges have been constructed on my steep banks.  The bridges are 3 to 5 kms from each other. These bridges were small steel wire rope suspension crossings where only in single line formation, a foot column could cross. If we move from east to  west, Bridge 1 at Dorkung west ,  Bridge 2 north of Ron la,  Bridge 3 near Dhola,  Bridge 4, Log  bridge, Temporary bridge and finally  Bridge 5  on Tsanghdar  and Tsangle Track.  The area along the river had long grass but otherwise full of rolling stones and thorny bushes. I  clearly  recollect  the story  of October 20, 1962, when  early morning at 5:00 am, 150  Chinese  Artillery guns roared and about 1000  rounds landed on my southern bank and Dhola ridge .

 A force of 12000 PLA troops were ready few miles away against an Indian brigade of 2000 soldiers. All intelligence agencies i.e. IB, SSB and Military Intelligence wing, including aerial reconnaissance missions were in Ostrich mode

Let me go back further. Indian 7 Infantry Brigade (Inf bde) had  moved in on my southern bank  and were deployed  all along the  southern  bank  from Bridge 1 to Bridge 5  in  late  September 1962.  4 Grenadiers  were  occupying  defences  on Dorkung bridge on Nyangjang  river  and Bridge 1,  9 Punjab  occupied  on  Bridge 2  and  Bridge 5.  Bridge 3, 4, Log Bridge and Temp Bridge was held by 2 Rajput Battalion (bn).  1/ 9 Gurkhas were holding defences at Tsangdhar adm base, Dropping Zone and Karpola 1 along with a troop of 17 Para field unit. One company (coy) was deployed in protection of Lumpu logistics base about 8 kms from Tawang. I could hear the sound of digging defences throughout day and night. Small patrolling parties often come up to the river and observe northern side. These troops were tough  and brave, equipped with  Sten machine, 303  Springfield bolt action Rifles and  Browning  Light Machine guns  with on  weapon scale and unit reserve  ammunition  and had  balaclava caps, OG  jersey and  short coat  Parkha. The cold winds continued blowing bringing temperature below 20 degrees with wind chill factor.  The troops were on constant vigil but not aware of what was brewing on my northern side.

I  was  aware  and  worried  as Chinese Force  419  was  marshalling  on  my northern  bank on  reverse  slopes  of Thangla  Ridge  with  three regiments (154  Regiment , 155 Regiment  and 157  Regiment  and an  additional Regiment  ex  11 Chinese  Div (please note  one  regiment is like a brigade with  three battalions  of 1000 troops each), which was to move on Bum La  axis  directly to  Tawang.  There was massive Artillery and Engineers build up. They had built a CL 9 road up to Thang la.  By October 14, 1962, they had moved into Nyanjang valley and deployed in forward assembly area. A force of 12000 PLA troops were ready few miles away against an Indian brigade of 2000 soldiers. All intelligence agencies i.e. IB, SSB and Military Intelligence wing,  including aerial reconnaissance missions were in Ostrich mode. Defence Minister Krishna Menon had convinced PM Nehru that it was a false alarm, Chinese will never attack.  The  water level  in the  my lap was 3 to 5 feet  at fords  and  l  was worried that Chinese may  cross from  river fords and not from Bridges, where Indian troops were focussed. In fact, PLA troops had infiltrated at 0100h silently between gaps in Indian posts.

At the first light of October 20, 1962, Sino India War started with heavy Pre H hour bombardment. Chinese troops  had already crossed  Namka Chu  and  attacked  2  Rajput  company  defended localities at  Bridge 3, 4, Log  Bridge and Temp  Bridge

At the first light of October 20, 1962, Sino India War started with heavy Pre H hour bombardment. Chinese troops  had already crossed  Namka Chu  and  attacked  2  Rajput  company  defended localities at  Bridge 3, 4, Log  Bridge and Temp  Bridge. Surprisingly, Tsangle  garrison  with 9 Punjab  and 1/9  Gurkha  company  in west and  4 Grenadiers and  9 Punjab company  troops at  Bridge 1 and 2 in east, were  not addressed by  Chinese force.  Major B K Pant was the gallant company commander at Bridge 4, which faced the brunt of Chinese regiment with 3 battalions.  They repulsed three waves of Chinese attacks. In the last, when company had suffered 75% casualty (82 out of 110 killed) Rajputs fought with bayonets, last man last round. Major Pant motivated his troops moving one trench to other. He was mortally wounded in stomach and both legs. His last words to his men were “Rajputs are born to die for the motherland. God has selected us to defend the blue water of Namka Chu.  Meanwhile,  B company  at Log bridge  and  C company  at Temp  bridge were fighting  another bloody battle  with Chinese  multiple human  waves.  Lieutenant Subash Chander who was commanding B company was also killed in close combat with the Chinese.  Capt B S Mangat (Adjutant) and Capt G S Bhatia (Vrc), also were mortally wounded. A company under Capt Ravi Eipe which was along Bridge 3 with a platoon at Dhola post also lost 61 troops. The most surprising factor was that most of assaults were from multi direction including from south (rear) direction. The battalion headquarters was the last to be demolished. Maj Gurdial Singh, MVC, fought leading with HQ troops and inflicted heavy casualty on Chinese troops. He was severely wounded along with commanding officer Lt Col M S Rikh, both were taken POWs. Rajputs fought valiantly last man last bullet but were finally over run.  4 Officers and 278 gallant soldiers of 2 Rajput made supreme sacrifice and 81 valiants were critically wounded on that day within 4 hours of battle. I had  tears in my  eyes  watching them  fight and  my water turning red  with gallant Rajput  blood defending frontiers of their nation.

The battle shifted to Tsangdar where Gurkhas fought valiantly and later their sharp khukris gave the Chinese bloody nose, E troop of 17 field fought open sights bravely and delayed the Chinese for few hours, were overrun.  Punjabis and Grenadiers were outflanked, suffered heavy casualties at Hathung la pass. Brigadier John Parshu Ram Dalvi, a fighter, commander 7 Inf bde which ceased to exist within 48 hours and who was taken POW on October 22 called this war as Himalayan Blunder. Tawang garrison was abandoned on October 23. Se La defences disintegrated on November 16 and Bomdila fell on November 18, 1962. Despite vintage weapons, limited ammunition, inclement weather, lack of cold weather clothing, lack of Arty support and without offensive air support, the Indian soldiers fought bravely in Kameng sector of NEFA. The War in Himalayas suddenly ended with China declaring unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962. PLA moved back to Macmahon Line.

This real story is written by me (Namka Chu) with tears in my eyes remembering the fallen heroes of Indian Army who smilingly laid down their lives defending this great country called India on my southern bank. I can still feel the brave hearts hugging me like a child to loving mother.

-The writer is an Indian Army veteran and a defence analyst. He has keen interest in Geo-strategic affairs and writes regularly on internal and external affairs issues related to India and neighbours. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda.