China recently introduced the third law in its series of legislations aimed at strengthening its hardline stance on border disputes, be they land or maritime. After the Coast Guard law, which came into effect on February 1, 2021, and the Maritime Traffic Safety law, notified on September 1, 2021, China adopted a new Land Border law on October 23. Like the previous two laws, the new law has been passed amid heightened tensions between China and its neighbours over border disputes, has raised security concerns amongst China’s neighbours, and drawn sharp rebuttals from them.
Provisions of the Land Border Law
The law, which will come into effect on January 1, 2022, stipulates that the State shall, following the principle of equality, mutual trust, and friendly consultation, handle land border related-affairs with neighbouring countries through negotiations to properly resolve disputes and longstanding border issues. The law has the following key focus areas:
- Empowering the PLA for Border Management. The law specifies that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP), both under the command of the Central Military Commission, will bear the major responsibility for safeguarding land borders, resisting armed invasion, and responding to major contingencies. It authorizes patrol officers to use police instruments and weapons against intruders who resort to violence in resisting detention and threaten the safety of life and property of other people.
- Mass Defense Strategy – Development of Border Areas to Special Military Action. The law stipulates that the State shall take measures to strengthen border defense, support economic and social development as well as opening-up in border areas, improve public services and infrastructure in such areas, encourage and support people’s life and work there, and promote coordination between border defense and social, economic development in border areas. In keeping with PRC’s “mass defence strategy” and the civil-military fusion strategy, the law has a separate clause emphasizing the role of Chinese citizens and civilian institutions in supporting the PLA and PAP. This seems to be a late addition to the focus areas of the law since an earlier draft version of the law included only one sentence requiring citizens and civilian organizations to assist the PLA and PAP. The newly added clause requires local governments in border areas to allocate resources to strengthen the building of “mass defence groups” to support border defence missions.
- Facilitating Inter-Agency Co-ordination for Border Management.
It streamlines the delineation of responsibility among various government departments and ministries including the foreign ministry, the public security ministry, and the customs and immigration administrations. It also authorizes the government to collaborate with neighboring countries in combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.
Possible Motivations behind the Law
While the overall motivation for the law could be China’s ambition to be in a position of eminence in what it calls a rules-based new global order, the law could be specifically motivated by the following considerations:-
- To settle the ongoing LAC dispute with India according to China’s desired end state.
- Need to control trans land border COVID transmission, which led to a spurt of COVID cases in border towns and regions like Yunnan, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia.
- Chinese concerns regarding stability in the region bordering Central Asia, especially after the withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan.
- Xi Jinping’s political consideration and desire to promote his coercive ethnic minority policy euphemistically worded as “forging a consciousness of the common identity of the Chinese nation”.
Is the Law Solely Aimed At India?
The overall theme of the law is to make overtly self-evident and undisputable statements that hint at an underlying hard lining of stance by PRC in its border dispute with India. For instance, the law asserts that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China are sacred and inviolable and goes on to say that the State shall take measures to safeguard territorial integrity and land boundaries and guard against and combat any act that undermines its territorial sovereignty and land boundaries. Innocuous as these sentences seem, read against the context of the LAC standoff, they assume an ominous meaning.
While the timing of the law, coming as it does in the middle of the LAC standoff with India, does raise suspicions that the Law is intended to legitimise China’s actions on the LAC, the law seems to address issues on PRC’s land borders with other countries like North Korea and Myanmar in addition to its borders with India, Nepal, and Bhutan as well. For instance, this law tackles issues unique to China’s border with North Korea by prohibiting using sound, lighting, or signs; floating materials through air or water; or engaging in other activities near the border that may affect China’s “friendly relations” with North Korea. The new law is also likely to make it easier for Chinese law enforcement agencies to continue rejecting, detaining, and forcibly repatriating North Koreans attempting to defect.
Likely Implications for India
The most significant change brought about by the law, which could have a major negative implication for India is making PLA the main agency responsible for border management. With the Chinese Army primarily responsible for border management, pulling back from PLA’s present deployment on the LAC seems very unlikely. Statements in the law like “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of…China are sacred and inviolable” also hint at China maintaining its present ground positions along the LAC and could make future negotiations intractable for India.
The law also seeks to legitimise actions by the Chinese Army on the LAC through various means. The law prohibits the construction of permanent facilities “near” China’s border without permission from Chinese authorities. Considering that India and China have varying perceptions of how the LAC runs, construction carried out by India on its perceived side of the LAC could be treated by China as having been carried out near China’s border creating the potential for additional friction. It also authorizes patrol officers to use police instruments and weapons against intruders who resort to violence in resisting detention and threaten the safety of life and property of other people, asking them to “take measures to safeguard [the] territorial integrity and land boundaries and guard against and combat any act that undermines [these]”.
The emphasis on the development of border towns and the role of civilians could lead to more “dual civil and military use” border villages being developed by China, which could be a security concern for India as China has been using the pretext of local civilians accessing their traditional lands, to carry out incursions across the perceived LAC, like in Demchok. Under the recent Coast Guard law, the Chinese Coast Guard has been given the authority to use lethal force to safeguard Chinese interests, essentially making the Coast Guard an arm of the PLAN. The permission given to “border villages” to use all methods of defence including combat essentially turns them into militia groups which would bolster up the PLA’s strength along the LAC.
Conclusion
As expected Indian government has voiced its concern on “China’s unilateral decision to bring about a legislation which can have implication on our [India’s] existing bilateral arrangements on border management as well as on the boundary question” and cautioned China to avoid “undertaking action under the pretext of this law which could unilaterally alter the situation in the India-China border areas”. However it is the actions taken by the two sides on ground and importantly the tone adopted by PLA in the next Corps Commander level talks that will give an indication of the direction that the Indo-China border dispute is headed towards after enactment of this legislation.
-The writer is a contract and technology management professional with more than twenty five years of experience. He has contributed to the strategic management of core technology projects of Aadhaar, the world’s largest biometric based identity system. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Raksha Anirveda
Bibliography
1. “New China law has made LAC negotiations tougher: Shyam Saran” Times of India, 06 Nov 2021.
- “China’s land border law: A preliminary assessment Shuxian Luo” Brooking.edu blog – Order from Chaos, 04 November 2021
- Ministry of External Affairs’ Official Spokesperson’s response to media queries on China’s Land Boundary Law, October 27, 2021
