Approaches To High-Tech Indigenisation and Atmanirbharta In Defence

The major reason why India is still far away from ‘Atmanirbharta’ is the mismatch between the arms we produce and the arms we buy. The government is trying to bridge this anomaly and create an improved environment for us as a nation to take a quantum leap into high technology defence production

By Dr Brig Deepak Das (Retd)

Opinion
Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath being briefed upon the infrastructural development towards state’s defence industrial corridor

Self-reliance or ‘Atmanirbharta’ is both a human as well as a national aspiration, which most associate with self-esteem and respect, but which has much larger connotations when it comes to the defence of a nation. India, despite seeking to attain this ambitious goal for decades has still been struggling to shed the tag of being the world’s largest importer of arms from 1990 till 2019, and as per SIPRI data published on 15 Mar 2021 still retains the inglorious distinction of being the second largest importer of arms globally.

Apart from shifting the goal post periodically, the only other thing India has shifted is its dependence policy from purely ‘look east’ (USSR/Russia) to ‘look west’ (USA/Europe) and now to a more diversified group of countries (Israel /South Korea). Between 1990 and 2019, India bought the most defence weapons globally and is ranked 38th in arms exports (mainly to countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, etc.).

Why hasn’t India’s Atmanirbharta in defence improved?

It’s not that we do not have the money, as we are the largest military spender iin the world today after the United States and China. However, it’s time that we stopped asking ‘Why haven’t we fared better?’ and focus on answering the question ‘How can we fare better?’ Notwithstanding the constant of ‘corruption in defence deals’, the major reason why India is still far away from ‘Atmanirbharta’ is the mismatch between the arms we produce or try to produce and the arms we buy. The government is trying to bridge this anomaly and create an improved environment for us as a nation to take a quantum leap into high technology defence production.

Policy Environment

The government has of late taken several consolidated policy initiatives like reviewing and promulgating a new defence acquisition policy – the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 (October 2020) which bans a list of 101 items from import, gives priority to ‘Buy Indian’ and incentivises technology acquisition though Defence Offsets, Strategic Partnerships (SPs), Design and Development (DRDO, DPSUs and OFB), Innovation for Defence Excellence (iDEX), Technology Development Fund (TDF), promoting MSMEs & start-ups to become ‘Buy Indian IDDM’ vendors.

The Consolidated FDI Policy 2020 (April 2020) has also been tweaked to safeguard against hostile takeovers or covert financing of anti-national activities by making it mandatory for any country with land border with India (China, Pakistan, etc.) to obtain government approval for all the limit of FDI in defence (automatic approval) to 74 per cent.

Similarly, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has formulated a draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy 2020 (DPEPP 2020), the key objectives of which also promote the development of a strong defence industry leading to higher self-reliance. Setting its sight on the need to reduce the current high import dependency, the draft policy identifies 13 sets of weapon systems/platforms (including fighters, helicopters, warships, missile systems, ammunition and explosives, land systems, and electronics) whose development and manufacture would commence latest by 2025.

Light Combat Aircraft LCA Mk II in Final Weapons Trials

Other objectives include an increase in domestic arms sales to Rs 170,000 crore ($26 billion) by 2025, with around one-fifths of it – Rs 35,000 crore ($5 billion) – coming through exports. The policy also intends to make India a “global leader in cyberspace and AI (artificial intelligence) technologies”. The MoD has concurrently released the DRDO’s Research Procurement Manual on 20 October 2020 and is in the process of revising the Defence Procurement Manual (DPM 2009-2011), through a committee under defence acquisition for streamlining revenue procurement. The coordinated and consolidated review of several defence related policies by the GoI based on the evidence of experiences of previous initiatives, wide circulation, and stakeholder review, has been a landmark achievement, which must be lauded.

Implementation Strategy And Institutional Arrangements

On the need to reduce the current high import dependency, the draft DPEPP 2020 identifies 13 sets of weapon systems/platforms (including fighters, helicopters, warships, missile systems, ammunition and explosives) whose development and manufacture would commence latest by 2025

Although criticised by some quarters for being overly ambitious and lacking commensurate institutional and pragmatic financial support, these policy initiatives, if implemented in sync with our envisaged integrated capability development plan, will push India closer towards its twin goals of achieving ‘Atmanirbharta’ and ‘exports in Defence’ and becoming a strong national power. In terms of process optimisation, the policies include strict timelines and clauses to cater for a wide variety of contingencies to ensure accountability and fair play without compromising on integrity. Multi-layered Trial Evaluation, preferably through dedicated organisations like Trial Wings in each Training Establishment, has also been recommended in the DAP 2020.

Strategic Thought & Visionary Actions

However, there is one major area where we are still taking tentative and incremental steps to promote indigenisation in high-technology defence capability. This area is our weak strategy implementation capability. The incremental increase in Indigenous Content (IC) from 30 per cent to 50 per cent to 60 per cent in various categorisation schemes and the lack of quantification in terms of specific indicators or timelines for achieving self-reliance and export capability is indicative of the lack of commitment and clear resolve to achieve milestones through resource commitment and collaborative accountability.

What the defence industry really needs is assured orders, which though given to DPSUs/DRDO/OFB (e.g. LCA, Aakash, Dhanush, Arjun, etc.) is still not being given in equal measure to the private sector, as incentive enough for them to get fully energised and mobilised. To break the glass ceiling of ‘Atmanirbharta’ in high-technology defence systems will require an extraordinary effort in both thought and action. It’s time we took courage to think strategically and adopt creative business models to try new approaches to technology development and acquisition. We have the capability but need the will to mobilise our minds and vast pool of national talent and resources in order to achieve self-reliance in defence in an accelerated time-frame.

BrahMos II ER supersonic cruise missile under development trials

Ideas And Approaches

1. National Defence Technology Acquisition & Development Strategy: How do we ensure that we provide the right incentives and triggers for innovation of high-technology systems to ensure that our integrated capability for defence is built on time and remains ahead of that of our adversaries? At the outset, it is of utmost importance to align our defence strategic planning process with our defence technology acquisition and development programme and strategy. At present the defence planning structure is neither inclusive of all the relevant stakeholders nor integrated at the strategic, operational and functional levels of governance and implementation.

The Raksha Mantri’s Operational Directives and not a formal National Security Strategy document still provide the guidelines for defence planning. The sole reliance on a Defence Planning Committee, SHQs/DRDO’s Technology Perspectives and advice to the RM will not allow us to progress at the rate our collective national talent and capability may allow. There is also constant debate the world over on making smart choices in defence planning and acquisition.

This can only happen if we open up our archaic institutional mechanisms and have objective debates before deciding to invest ugly sums of money on say – a nuclear triad, given that we already have a ‘second strike capability’; or ponder over 110 imported fighter jets over indigenously manufactured variants of such aircraft like LCA MK2, AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft); or not reprioritise UAVs / UCAVs, precision hypersonic SSMs or DEW (Directed Energy Weapons) over manned aircraft; UCVs (unmanned combat vehicles) over MBTs (Main Battle Tanks)… and are they really ‘main’ in today’s context? Also, who will watch the horizon or look into the future for transformative defence technologies and capabilities using AI/ML, robotics, quantum computing, cyber, or such other constantly evolving means? Should we leave it to happenstance, or MSMEs or iDEX or can we institutionalise it? Why are we preparing for conventional wars when the threat is hybrid?

2. Creation of Defence and Aerospace Corridors / Ecosystem: Just as a fledgling start-up needs a business incubator / accelerator, the Indian defence industrial base (DIB) needs a conducive defence and aerospace eco-system to attain the DPEPP 2020 vision of making India ‘amongst the leading countries of the world in defence’. The creation of a defence and aerospace ecosystem / corridor costs billions of dollars and decades to mature, but stands out as generational steps in a country’s history. The Private Sector adds immense value; but governments both central and states need to have skin in this game. This is a real challenge in our country. The Private Sector shies away because government policies are not consistent and major programs are tied to DRDO & DPSUs with minimal private sector traction.

AMCA, Projects under development

DRDO and DPSUs do add immense value but they certainly have limitations and need the private sector to bring talent, money, and global reach. The MoD had announced two defence corridors – one around Tamil Nadu and the other in Uttar Pradesh in 2018. The corridors overlap with existing defence public and private sector companies already existing in the corridor. The Uttar Pradesh Defence Industrial Corridor (UPDIC) has six nodes at Lucknow, Kanpur, Agra, Aligarh, Chitrakoot and Jhansi. The Tamil Nadu Defence Industrial Corridor (TANDICO) has five nodes at Chennai, Hosur, Salem, Coimbatore, and Tiruchirappalli.

Other objectives of the DPEPP include an increase in domestic arms sales to Rs 170,000 crore by 2025, with around one-fifths of it – Rs 35,000 crore – coming through exports. The policy also intends to make India a “global leader in cyberspace and AI technologies

The decision to build a defence and aerospace corridor in the southern states (Andhra, Telangana, Tamil Naidu, Karnataka, Kerala) presents the most promising value proposition in terms of basic infrastructure, supporting industry, talent pool, institutions, existing industry (HAL, BEL, ECIL, BML, TATA, Mahindra, Leyland, L&T, Bharat Forge, Kirloskar, TVS, many others…..), Real Estate/Infrastructure Developers, Armed Forces Training Institutions/Operational Commands/ Test Ranges (Army, Navy, Air force), Science and Technology Institutions (IITs/IISc/NITs…), Major Labs (DRDO, ISRO, BARC), a multitude of 3,000 plus SMEs developed by DRDO, DPSUs, ISRO & BARC, presence of global majors, etc. It is time that the country leverages this ecosystem. The UPDIC will have to overcome several challenges before it can benefit from a similar ecosystem.

At present, the Defence and Aerospace Corridors of TANDICO and UPDIC have extended incentives and concessions through a plethora of subsidies, including an Offset Multiplier of x2 for IOPs established in the corridors. However, the FDI or acquisition of technology through new policy initiatives has still not fructified to the extent expected. Perhaps, we should analyse and build our own institutional infrastructure and processes to feed and support this ecosystem. We need to understand that a US DARPA like structure without the help of associated institutions like SCO (Strategies Capabilities Office), DIU (Defense Innovation Unit), AFC (Army Futures Command), AFRL (AF Research Laboratory), ONR (Office of Naval Research), and such organisations would be incomplete. Should we then, in the Indian context, always fall back to examine the ISRO and Atomic Energy Commission models or should we endeavour to build up our own DARPA like institutional arrangements to support the ecosystem?

While there is merit in giving priority to identified key development sectors, making them autonomous and/or placing them under the direct purview of the PM, too many overly centralised structures may make development imbalanced and limit open innovation. India currently imports more than 80% of its precision scientific instruments for space projects and fear of this dependence led to the creation of IN-SPACe (Indian Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre). Perhaps, we can invigorate the defence industrial eco-system through the setting up of similar support institutional arrangements for the Defence Industrial Corridors (DIC) to encourage the participation of private players.

Ghatak UCAV

Also, institutionalised initiatives like open innovation competitions amongst companies/consortiums with the award of a defence contract as the prize may boost participation. We may also make the policy of co-location in the industrial corridor more flexible by allowing a graduated process of obtaining defence orders first and relocating with benefits in phase two, so as to encourage existing private MSMEs. Other initiatives may include the opening of Regional Academic Centres for Defence and Aerospace like the RAC-S for Space at IIT (BHU). In fact, cross functional technologies like AI, robotics, autonomous devices, quantum computing, big data, etc should be given direction and impetus through such institutional arrangements.

3. Adoption of an Open Architecture Technology Development Approach: The Common Standard Open-Architecture approach to technology development is another interesting way to promote high-technology indigenous development in defence as has been proved in several open architecture activities in western countries. Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) or Open Systems Approach is a technical and business strategy for designing an affordable and adaptable system. A MOSA is the US DoD preferred method for implementation of open systems, and it is required by United States law.

Given the nascent stage at which the private defence industrial base in India is, this approach would promote collaborative research, rapid design and prototyping, and afford equal opportunities to defence firms in the DIB. The open-architecture approach to technology development, as the name suggests, replaces the SQR with an open-architecture with common standards, which is the outcome of a preliminary consortium project. Once the open architecture is evolved, it is demonstrated and/or promulgated to the DIB to use for design and development of systems by individual companies or consortiums. An open architecture approach apart from setting a high-technology common standard and reducing cost, supports the retention of the critical capabilities of portability, scalability, and interoperability of forces/equipment/training and logistics chains. Currently, there are several open architecture activities in the EU/EDA, UK, USA, NATO, etc. in areas of vehicles/platforms, communication devices, soldier systems, etc. The creation of a Defence Industry Standards through a MOSA like working group will support interoperability, portability, scalability and make products and services equally available to the public under fair and reasonable terms.

DRDO and DPSUs do add immense value but they certainly have limitations and need the private sector to bring talent, money, and global reach. The MoD had announced two defence corridors – one around Tamil Nadu and the other in Uttar Pradesh in 2018

4. Building Up Sector-Specific Ecosystems/Parks: Aviation, Maritime and Land: The LCA is a great step forward after almost six decades of India inducting the HF-24 during the late 1950s. HAL has emerged as system integrators with indigenous content being 50 per cent, which will increase to 60-70 per cent with time. On the other hand, India has been manufacturing (assembling) foreign aircraft since the 1960s. However, it had to go back to OEM as well as pay heavily for upgrades – be it the MiG-21, MiG-29, Su-30, Mirage-2000 or the Jaguar. This would not be the case with LCA as India would be able to integrate sensors and weapons systems on its own in future, which will give independence in capability building.

While there is merit in enhancing the involvement of the private sector, that should not cast aspersions on or be linked only to the LCA program. The LCA has also given India options to build LCA Mk-2, AMCA & UCAVs. There is news that the IAF is tendering another 114 aircraft costing an upfront $15 billion with an estimated lifetime support cost of approx. $82 billion. The IAF plans to acquire 450 fighter aircraft for deployment on the northern and western frontiers of the country over the next 35 years. Shouldn’t the government or MoD think it prudent to channel most of these monies into the programme for the evolving Tejas series of aircraft – Mk-II, AMCA (advanced medium combat aircraft), or building UCAVs/UAXs, etc.?

A possible solution to speed up development in the aviation sector with the least amount of changes would be the establishment of an Aeronautics Commission. JS, MOCA in one of the webinars mentioned that India is going to establish a National Aeronautics Board that would be headed by the Prime Minister. If this happens, it would be a great step to fill the gaps in the aeronautics ecosystem and stimulate aeronautics research, development, and manufacturing.

Similarly, under the Naval P75 program, the TOT to Indian shipyard and industry has been extensive and encompasses transferring manufacturing capabilities and expertise in quality control for several tasks. This has resulted in qualification of skilled local manpower. Today India is one of the few countries that has mastered the complete chain of submarine construction and is at par with most other international shipyards. Can we look at capitalising on this experience to promote exports in ship and submarine construction?

The eco-system for land warfare systems has similarly been growing around armament, wheeled, tracked and amphibious vehicle establishments. There is a clear desire to convert these to high mobility and /or autonomous and integrated platforms, which envisages a conversion of several high-end technologies or cross-functional technologies. Our design of aerospace and defence sector specific parks should hinge on a shared pool of such cross-functional technological innovations and resources.

INS Vela at launch at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd

End Note

Even though we are taking several steps to move closer to our goal of ‘Atmanirbharta’ in defence, the singular intent should not be acquisition of high technology arms but rather acquisition of high technology itself. In spite of our endeavours to acquire high-end defence technology through multipliers on value of discharge obligations (x3 and x4) given in the Offset Policy, increasing FDI from 26 per cent to 49 per cent to 74 per cent, and other means of incentivisation like the SP Model, we are way behind our major adversaries. This should be addressed through the synergy of buying high technology through the efforts of strategic partnership with technology providers as well as investing heavily in research and development through an accountable public-private partnership open innovation model. We must also stop trying to play ‘wake up and catch up’ with the Dragon, but rather evolve our own innovative means of hybrid warfare, focussing on space, cyber, DEW, UAXs, and newer methods of combat.

One factor which belittles our efforts and confidence as a nation is the ‘constant of corruption’. Time and again we see lucrative defence capital projects shift out from the ‘Design and Make in India’ bravado to the sad reality of mega ‘Buy (Global)’ Tenders architected by the import lobby. It’s perhaps time we changed this ‘constant’ by not weighing ourselves down with more gold in our individual pockets, but by putting our nation before self!

–The writer is an alumnus of NDA, DSSC and CDM and is currently based in Germany where he works as a defence research and strategy consultant. He is an active member of India’s Science, Indigenous Technology and Advanced Research Accelerator (SITARA) – a not for profit organisation